This lengthy (well, at least by my standard) reply is in response to comments Dawson Bethrick and I have traded in response to my post “Dawson’s (Mis)Understanding of TAs” found here
Dawson wrote: I’m not sure why this is so important to you. As I indicated in my original comment, not only does RK not provide an argument for his god’s existence, he does not – from what I can see – provide any argument for the position he’s defending. That was what I was trying to say in response to your claim that his argument is “presuppositional.” If there’s no argument, then there’s no argument to call “presuppositional.” If the way I responded implied that I think presuppositionalism is used exclusively for proving the existence of a god, you have my apologies – I did not mean to imply this.
Truth is important to me, and I didn’t think you were being completely truthful with me in the reason you gave for responding as you did. I’m still not sure at this point. You did, after all, state explicitly that you didn’t believe RK presented any argument. You did this *after* making the comment I am taking you to task over, so I fail to see how the comment in question was merely a failed attempt to state something you stated explicitly in the very next paragraph.
Regardless, I’m ready to move on.
Dawson wrote: Now I will note that your blog post implies (at least on my reading) that presuppositionalism and transcendental arguments are one and the same. That is not my understanding.
You need to be more specific than that. Granted, the method of Presupp and the use of TAs typically go hand-in-hand (for obvious reasons), but they aren’t the same at all. If you think I am conflating the two, then please give specifics as to why.
Dawson wrote: Presuppositionalism is typically described as an approach to apologetics which includes the use of a transcendental argument, without equating its transcendental argument as such with presuppositionalism proper.
Agreed. Although one need not use a TA while arguing presuppositionally, it is a common thing to do as the only way to argue for one’s ultimate presuppositions is via a TA.
Dawson wrote: I know that on at least one occasion, a presuppositionalist has scolded me for implying that presuppositionalism and TAG are the same (when in fact I did not).
Was it me? If so, please point it out. If not, this is irrelevant.
BK wrote: You know, I guess it doesn’t surprise me that you didn’t recognize RK’s use of a TA anymore than you recognized it when Bahnsen explicitly used it against Stein (as you so clearly demonstrate in your post titled ‘Bahsen’s Proof’.)
Dawson wrote: First of all, it’s Bahnsen’s Poof, not Bahnsen’s “Proof.” Since I didn’t find any argument in Bahnsen’s opening statement, it would be a misnomer to call what he presents a “proof.” I see it more as a “poof” – as in, “Poof! God exists!”
Ah, I see I misread your post title - my apologies.
Dawson stated: Also, you say that I have failed to recognize an argument that, according to what you seem to be saying, is plainly there, both in the case of RK’s debate with Mitch LeBlanc, as well as in the case of Bahnsen’s debate with Dr. Stein. As I explained to Chris Bolt in my two-part comment on 2 Sept., TAs are considered to be a type of deductive argument. I cited presuppositional theorist David Byron who states this and goes on to say that a transcendental argument is “distinguished from other deductive arguments by its modality and its particular subject matter.” He also states that “a transcendental argument may be expressed in the form of Modus Ponens.” (Both quotations come from Byron’s 28 Aug. 1998 post to The Van Til list, msg. #00374.)
In my own reading of Byron’s answer to the question “what does a formally expressed transcendental argument look like?” in the aforementioned post (thank you very much for the cite, btw), I don’t see such a cut and dry answer as you seem to present in quoting a very small portion of everything he had to say. Rather, Byron claims a formalized representation of TAs is controversial, and the aspect of that representation he points to is the very aspect you fail to include in your attempt to formalize Butler’s expression of a TA - the “formalization of the transcendental premise itself.”
It is, after all, the transcendental premise that is so easily attacked (whether successfully or not), and which makes any particular formalized representation so contentious. Byron says the same thing in the same post referenced above:
“The ease with which this objection arises suggests that a TA must be a multiform affair, involving not only the presentation of the phenomenological description of an intentional operation and the claim regarding the preconditions of that operation, but also a second argument in defense of the transcendental premise itself.”
But more importantly, Byron then states that the way in which this premise is argued for is by retorsion - that is, from the impossibility of the contrary. Hmm .. I wonder where I’ve heard that phrase before? Oh yes, in the last paragraph of Bahnsen’s opening statement in his debate with Stein.
“When we go to look at the different world views that atheists and theists have, I suggest we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary. The transcendental proof for God's existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove anything. The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot account for our debate tonight.” (source)
In this statement Bahnsen not only calls out the specific “form” of argument he plans on using, he also explains how he intends on defending the transcendental premise, by appealing to the “impossibility of the contrary”. And then, in Bahnsen’s second opening statement, he lays out his justification for claiming that the non-existence of God is (logically) impossible
“Dr. Stein proposes an atheist world view. I propose a Christian theistic world view. There are other proposals out there that may want their evening to debate as well. I'm maintaining that the proof of the Christian world view is that the denial of it leads to irrationality. That is, without the Christian God, you cannot prove anything.” (source - emphasis mine)
Bahnsen then proceeds through the remainder of the debate to give examples of how a denial of Christianity leads to absurdity, specifically in the areas of logic, morality and induction. You may not agree that the examples he gave were compelling, but to say he never presented an argument is a clear demonstration of a failure to understand just what a TA is and how it operates.
RK used exactly the same method of argumentation, even though he was not arguing for God per se. His transcendental premise was actually the thesis he was defending in the debate, namely that “The Triune God of Scripture is the proper ground for all knowledge.”. Notice that RK chose a very specific thesis to argue, and that part of that thesis was the Triune God ”of scripture”. In other words, the Triune God as presented in scripture is the proper ground for all knowledge. Consider the implications of this as it pertains to questions in this debate as to whether God may have lied in his revelation.
Moving on, in section 1.5, RK gives us the first clear indication he will be employing a TA - the type of argument - by stating that any person attempting to argue from other than the Christian position has to “borrow” from the Christian position to do so (the Christian position obviously being what is found in the Bible). This is the hallmark of a TA - claiming that even a denial of the claim in question requires one to accept/employ it. The “transcendental” (i.e. the precondition) in this case is the Christian worldview as found in the Bible. Accordingly, anyone arguing against Christianity must borrow from it (and by extension the Biblical revelation) to do so.
RK then explains (for the uninitiated) the method he intends on using (presuppositionalism), by quoting part of Bahnsen’s own opening statement in section 2.2 of his opening, which I will not bother to quote here.
RK then dedicates the entirety of section 4 of his opening to the topic of “the impossibility of the contrary” (sound familiar?). Here he spends a great deal of time explicating his “transcendental premise”, as it is always the most contentious in a TA (as we have already seen). He clearly presents his reasons as to why he believes a denial of the Triune God of the Bible is a deathblow to one’s ability to know anything at all.
At this point, RK has made it abundantly clear that his “program” is to show that any denial of the God of the Bible requires one to borrow from the Biblical Christian worldview, meaning that any failure to do so will result in irrationality. This “program”, if he is successful, will be proof-positive of the truth of his thesis.
At this point (as in the Bahnsen/Stein debate), RK proceeded to outline point after point where the Christian worldview provides a foundation for knowledge, whereas a denial of it (Mitch’s denial, in this case) leads to irrationality. Again, you may or may not agree that RK was successful at this stage, but to state that RK presented no argument is to (once again) show a complete lack of understanding of a TA.
Dawson said: Of course, even in the case of Butler’s formulation, if the goal of the argument is to establish the existence of “God,” and yet its existence is assumed in one of its premises, then the argument is fallaciously circular, flat and simple.
Well, I don’t care much for your reformulation of Butler’s formulation. However, I will present for you Bahsen’s formulation, and one that I am more than comfortable with:
“The proof of God’s existence is that without him you cannot prove anything.”
There ...that is an “informal” representation of TAG that begs no questions. How do I know God exists? Well, because I cannot reason about anything at all ... even his existence ... without first presupposing he exists. Now, if you see this as a simple case of petitio principii, then there really is nothing further to say about this subject until you do some homework and get up to speed on what is involved in arguing for/from your ultimate commitments.
Dawson wrote: In the case of Bahnsen’s debate with Stein, my understanding is that Bahnsen’s side of the resolution was that the Christian god exists. I found nowhere in his opening statement where Bahnsen put forward an argument which takes the above form and leads to the conclusion “therefore God exists.” Certainly not in any non-question-begging manner anyway.
“Certainly not in any non-question-begging manner anyway”?
Well, which is it? Did you not see any argument which takes the above form, or did you not see one which take the above form in a non-question-begging manner?
Dawson wrote: Similarly, in RK’s debate with LeBlanc, RK’s task was, presumably, to present an argument which concludes something along the lines of “therefore, the Triune God of the Scriptures is the basis of knowledge.” I found no such argument in RK’s opening statement, or elsewhere in his statements for that matter.
Well, I have now presented for you in painful detail exactly where RK presented what his argument was, how he planned on arguing for it, and how he actually did argue for it.
Dawson said: If I have missed something in either Bahnsen’s or RK’s statements, perhaps you could restate the argument, in the format given above, using only quotations from either arguer to assemble the argument he allegedly made.
I have done better. I have explained why the format above is insufficient/inappropriate, and have laid out both Bahnsen’s and RK’s argument for you informally.
I will take up Part III of your response and the question of axioms in a separate post.
BK
What's up with the blog?
Please excuse our constant change of face as I try out different blog templates over the next day or so.
Dawson's (Mis)Understanding of TAs
This post is in response to a series of back and forth comments between Dawson Bethrick and myself in the post Missing the Basics below:
BK wrote: “If you are truly uninitiated enough about Presuppositionalism as a method to think it is exclusively used in arguments for the existence of God, then I suggest you go back and do some more reading on the subject.”
Dawson wrote: I never stated that presuppositionalism “is exclusively used in arguments for the existence of God.” I am quite aware of presuppositionalism’s intended aims, its devices, its gimmicks.
The fact that you referenced RK’s comment that his argument was not for the existence of God made it clear enough what you were implying; thus my response. If you are going to be disingenuous about something as trivial as this, what else are you willing to be dishonest about? Perhaps the fact that a TA uses no gimmicks to achieve its aims?
BK wrote: “I was present for the debate between RK and ML, and know exactly what RK successfully argued for… He… argued for the resolution at hand - that the Triune God of the Scriptures is the basis for knowledge.”
Dawson wrote: I have examined the transcript of the debate quite closely. I could not find an actual argument for the claim that the Christian god is the basis of knowledge. I saw this position asserted quite frequently, and RK apparently felt the need to build it into his view through what he called “axioms.” But I did not see an argument. If you did, could you reproduce it? What are the premises? I’d love to examine it.
You know, I guess it doesn’t surprise me that you didn’t recognize RK’s use of a TA anymore than you recognized it when Bahnsen explicitly used it against Stein (as you so clearly demonstrate in your post titled “Bahsen’s Proof”.)
Are you familiar with the form of a Transcendental Argument, regardless of what a person is attempting to prove by using it? You certainly pay lip service to the fact that it is indirect rather than direct, but apparently don’t account for that fact while evaluating either RK’s or Bahnsen’s TA.
I have read part I of your critique of RK, and have oh so much to say about it, but plan on dedicating a separate post (or series of posts) when I get the time to do so.
BK wrote: “RK’s appeal to scripture is expected (necessary, even) as a Christian Presuppositionalist, and you should know this”
Dawson wrote: Of course I know this. This is why I pointed out that presuppositionalists have no alternative to arguing in a circle when their theistic premises are questioned.
And yet you miss the oh-so-obvious reason why. Nobody is denying Christians reason in a circle (just as anyone who is arguing for their ultimates must do) when they appeal to scripture. [At least Christian Presuppositianlists are honest enough to admit what they are doing]. What is the alternative? I agree with Van Til who would prefer reasoning in a circle to not reasoning at all.
Those who are familiar with TAs understand that the question of reasoning about one’s ultimate commitments is essentially no different in form than reasoning about one’s own existence. The reason TAG is stated indirectly is to avoid the fallacy of simply appealing to God in order to prove the existence of God. Rather, TAs about the existence of God use the phrase “the impossibility of the contrary” to elucidate the fact that that since a denial of the existence of God leads to logical absurdities, an affirmation of his existence is therefore logically necessary.
Some (like yourself) may prefer to label that as fallacious in nature, but doing so demonstrates a lack of understanding of the only way to argue for one’s ultimate commitments.
Perhaps I will put together something that addresses this problem in more detail.
BK
BK wrote: “If you are truly uninitiated enough about Presuppositionalism as a method to think it is exclusively used in arguments for the existence of God, then I suggest you go back and do some more reading on the subject.”
Dawson wrote: I never stated that presuppositionalism “is exclusively used in arguments for the existence of God.” I am quite aware of presuppositionalism’s intended aims, its devices, its gimmicks.
The fact that you referenced RK’s comment that his argument was not for the existence of God made it clear enough what you were implying; thus my response. If you are going to be disingenuous about something as trivial as this, what else are you willing to be dishonest about? Perhaps the fact that a TA uses no gimmicks to achieve its aims?
BK wrote: “I was present for the debate between RK and ML, and know exactly what RK successfully argued for… He… argued for the resolution at hand - that the Triune God of the Scriptures is the basis for knowledge.”
Dawson wrote: I have examined the transcript of the debate quite closely. I could not find an actual argument for the claim that the Christian god is the basis of knowledge. I saw this position asserted quite frequently, and RK apparently felt the need to build it into his view through what he called “axioms.” But I did not see an argument. If you did, could you reproduce it? What are the premises? I’d love to examine it.
You know, I guess it doesn’t surprise me that you didn’t recognize RK’s use of a TA anymore than you recognized it when Bahnsen explicitly used it against Stein (as you so clearly demonstrate in your post titled “Bahsen’s Proof”.)
Are you familiar with the form of a Transcendental Argument, regardless of what a person is attempting to prove by using it? You certainly pay lip service to the fact that it is indirect rather than direct, but apparently don’t account for that fact while evaluating either RK’s or Bahnsen’s TA.
I have read part I of your critique of RK, and have oh so much to say about it, but plan on dedicating a separate post (or series of posts) when I get the time to do so.
BK wrote: “RK’s appeal to scripture is expected (necessary, even) as a Christian Presuppositionalist, and you should know this”
Dawson wrote: Of course I know this. This is why I pointed out that presuppositionalists have no alternative to arguing in a circle when their theistic premises are questioned.
And yet you miss the oh-so-obvious reason why. Nobody is denying Christians reason in a circle (just as anyone who is arguing for their ultimates must do) when they appeal to scripture. [At least Christian Presuppositianlists are honest enough to admit what they are doing]. What is the alternative? I agree with Van Til who would prefer reasoning in a circle to not reasoning at all.
Those who are familiar with TAs understand that the question of reasoning about one’s ultimate commitments is essentially no different in form than reasoning about one’s own existence. The reason TAG is stated indirectly is to avoid the fallacy of simply appealing to God in order to prove the existence of God. Rather, TAs about the existence of God use the phrase “the impossibility of the contrary” to elucidate the fact that that since a denial of the existence of God leads to logical absurdities, an affirmation of his existence is therefore logically necessary.
Some (like yourself) may prefer to label that as fallacious in nature, but doing so demonstrates a lack of understanding of the only way to argue for one’s ultimate commitments.
Perhaps I will put together something that addresses this problem in more detail.
BK
Response To Mitch LeBlanc's Odd Ontological Argument
Mitch LeBlanc has written an alleged defense of his attempt to redefine God and hence defeat the presuppositionalist program. You may find his article here:
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/
Mitch writes, “I would first like to explain that while the idea of a lying God is logically absurd on a Thomist conception of God, it is not logically absurd on a Presuppositionalist conception.” What follows this claim is rather odd. Mitch thinks that a Thomist appealing to Anselm’s “definition” of God can show that the idea of a lying God is logically absurd. The Thomist may do so as follows:
“1. God is the being that which none greater can be conceived
2. It is greater to be honest than to be a liar
3. Therefore, God is honest.”
However if Mitch grants this, then he should have no trouble granting this:
“1. God is the being described in Christian Scripture
2. The description excludes the possibility of lying
3. Therefore, God is honest.”
There is also no problem if Mitch thinks that the definition provided via Anselm is compatible with the God of Christian Scripture.
All of this is in accordance with what Mitch has himself presented. One may expect that I should present something a bit different.
As many different concepts of gods as there are why should Anselm’s be accepted? Rejecting the concept appears to entail no contradiction. It looks arbitrary unless we take into account where it is being used at which point it looks contrived. Even accepting the intentionality proposed in the first premise, there is no reason given to accept the second premise. Why should we accept that it is greater to be honest than to be a liar? Perhaps it is greater to be a liar than to be honest. Mitch will need to argue for this premise if it is to stick, but, and this is the most significant part of the response to what Mitch offers regarding Thomism; all of this is quite irrelevant to the subject before us.
The alleged Thomist definition of God as synonymous with Anselm’s definition is false, as Thomists are in the Christian tradition and hence ultimately define God in terms of Scripture. This is one of the biggest problems with Thomism, the god it proves is not the God of Christian Scripture though the Thomist will try his or her hardest to have a person believe that it is. Merely labeling the supposed result of a syllogism “God” does not close the gap between what has actually been proven, if anything, and what the God of Scripture is described to be. God is already assumed in the premises of traditional arguments for the existence of God, and in actuality the whole enterprise presupposes the existence of God anyway.
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/
Mitch writes, “I would first like to explain that while the idea of a lying God is logically absurd on a Thomist conception of God, it is not logically absurd on a Presuppositionalist conception.” What follows this claim is rather odd. Mitch thinks that a Thomist appealing to Anselm’s “definition” of God can show that the idea of a lying God is logically absurd. The Thomist may do so as follows:
“1. God is the being that which none greater can be conceived
2. It is greater to be honest than to be a liar
3. Therefore, God is honest.”
However if Mitch grants this, then he should have no trouble granting this:
“1. God is the being described in Christian Scripture
2. The description excludes the possibility of lying
3. Therefore, God is honest.”
There is also no problem if Mitch thinks that the definition provided via Anselm is compatible with the God of Christian Scripture.
All of this is in accordance with what Mitch has himself presented. One may expect that I should present something a bit different.
As many different concepts of gods as there are why should Anselm’s be accepted? Rejecting the concept appears to entail no contradiction. It looks arbitrary unless we take into account where it is being used at which point it looks contrived. Even accepting the intentionality proposed in the first premise, there is no reason given to accept the second premise. Why should we accept that it is greater to be honest than to be a liar? Perhaps it is greater to be a liar than to be honest. Mitch will need to argue for this premise if it is to stick, but, and this is the most significant part of the response to what Mitch offers regarding Thomism; all of this is quite irrelevant to the subject before us.
The alleged Thomist definition of God as synonymous with Anselm’s definition is false, as Thomists are in the Christian tradition and hence ultimately define God in terms of Scripture. This is one of the biggest problems with Thomism, the god it proves is not the God of Christian Scripture though the Thomist will try his or her hardest to have a person believe that it is. Merely labeling the supposed result of a syllogism “God” does not close the gap between what has actually been proven, if anything, and what the God of Scripture is described to be. God is already assumed in the premises of traditional arguments for the existence of God, and in actuality the whole enterprise presupposes the existence of God anyway.
A Brief Introductory Response To Mitch LeBlanc Concerning His Question
Mitch LeBlanc has written an alleged defense of his attempt to redefine God and hence defeat the presuppositionalist program. You may find his article here:
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/
During a debate, Mitch asked of Razorskiss, “What if God is deceiving you?”
Several times now I have stated that this question is subject to Fallacy of Complex Question. Mitch disagrees, writing, “I did not present a false dichotomy of a yes or no, in which case I would agree that a labelling [sic] of my question as fallacy would be warranted” and “my question (2) does not force an answer in a similar manner [to illustrative question ‘1’ (“Do you know that God is deceiving you?”)]” in an attempt to justify this disagreement. My response to this is that Mitch just needs to review the fallacy in question. For the Fallacy of Complex Question to apply to a question the question does not need to require a “Yes or No” answer, therefore Mitch’s attempted justification for disagreement on whether or not the fallacy applies fails.
This aside, I have claimed that the question “What if God is deceiving you?” requires that some consequence or consequences be named if it is the case that God is deceiving the recipient of the question. I cannot think of how any such answer, if one were able to supply it (it is inconceivable to me that God should lie), would serve to further understanding for either the Objectivist or the presuppositionalist. The point of the question appears to me to be to suggest that God can lie, and nothing more. We will examine this suggestion soon, if the Lord wills.
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/
During a debate, Mitch asked of Razorskiss, “What if God is deceiving you?”
Several times now I have stated that this question is subject to Fallacy of Complex Question. Mitch disagrees, writing, “I did not present a false dichotomy of a yes or no, in which case I would agree that a labelling [sic] of my question as fallacy would be warranted” and “my question (2) does not force an answer in a similar manner [to illustrative question ‘1’ (“Do you know that God is deceiving you?”)]” in an attempt to justify this disagreement. My response to this is that Mitch just needs to review the fallacy in question. For the Fallacy of Complex Question to apply to a question the question does not need to require a “Yes or No” answer, therefore Mitch’s attempted justification for disagreement on whether or not the fallacy applies fails.
This aside, I have claimed that the question “What if God is deceiving you?” requires that some consequence or consequences be named if it is the case that God is deceiving the recipient of the question. I cannot think of how any such answer, if one were able to supply it (it is inconceivable to me that God should lie), would serve to further understanding for either the Objectivist or the presuppositionalist. The point of the question appears to me to be to suggest that God can lie, and nothing more. We will examine this suggestion soon, if the Lord wills.
Dawson Bethrick, The Man Who Builds His House Upon The Sand
Bethrick's most recent response to my post here - http://choosinghats.blogspot.com/2009/09/all-bethrick-all-time.html is frankly one of the poorest responses I have ever seen him make.
Objectivists, as I understand it, have never quite been accepted in the realm of academic philosophy (if you do not believe me, try to research the topic via philosophical sources; most encyclopedias do not even mention Objectivism or Rand). Their terminology is often extremely vague, and there is reason for this. Rand was after certainty in a world which told her, and everyone else, that there is no such thing. She presented ideas to counter this, to give people a place to stand that is peppered with pragmatism. Philosophy is not a joke or a game to Objectivists, they want something they can live and die by without worrying about the skeptic.
Of course, fiction books and obfuscation are not the route to countering, for example, the rigorous skeptical epistemologies found in the non-Christian schools I grew up in nor the atheistic and liberal Philosophy and Religion departments I did my undergraduate work in. If one is to be honest with oneself, he or she cannot simply hand waive the arguments which have been offered by the skeptics since the beginning of recorded philosophical inquiry. Thankfully there is good news for gentlemen like Mr. Bethrick. Christ offers hope for those who would find none in their allegedly God-less, directionless worlds. Christ offers certainty and knowledge as a response to the foolish wisdom of the world. All of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Him.
Unfortunately Bethrick has continued his dishonest (or perhaps ignorant, though I do not know how this could be the case at this point in his "career") denial of rather basic facts; substituting for reality his own arbitrary beliefs to try and escape from argumentation and the skepticism it leads to.
For example Bethrick writes that there is no such thing as a circular definition, which is just false. I invite the reader to study a little logic and he or she will come across discussions of circular definitions rather quickly. Even Googling "circular definitions" brings up a lengthy list. ( For example - http://www.onegoodmove.org/fallacy/circle.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_definition )
Bethrick often recommends books. I will return the favor and recommend Copi's Introduction to Logic, which contains a useful discussion of this subject.
Upon studying the topic of definitions in the broader subject of logic, one may also discover that definitions are often provided by way of example. Bethrick claims that I have written something "patently false" when I state that he does not provide a definition for "previously validated' by way of example. Calling something patently false with the result that it actually becomes such may be fine in Bethrick's Peter Pan epistemology, but it does not work out so well in reality. As I explained, the illustration provided by Bethrick does not exemplify "previously validated" at all, which is what is needed if Bethrick seeks to define the term by way of example. Again, the "definition" provided is circular, it presents us with no new understanding of the term in question. Further, “the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works.” Bethrick responds to this, "You didn’t ask me to show how it works. I was only responding to the questions which you had asked." No, I did not ask him to show me how it works, I asked him for a definition of what it is. He may do this by way of a non-circular definition, example, obstensibly, etc. but the point is that he has done none of the above. It may help the reader to review my previous post concerning this.
I will not at this moment take the time to review what Bethrick said concerning whether or not previously validated (whatever that means, he still has not told us) facts can be unseated by newly experienced facts. It is possible I misquoted him. It is not important. If Bethrick thinks that new facts can unseat previously validated facts but do not ever actually do so then there is no pragmatic distinction being made. The argument remains the same.
The vacuousness of the next part of Bethrick's response is equivalent to that of the part already discussed as Bethrick fails to see when the very arguments he uses apply to his own position. Recall, for example, that Bethrick submits in his illustration that the scientist, after having apparently tested or at least after having relied upon testimony of the testing of water, knows that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Now, I submitted that the scientist does not know this at all, for the scientist has only "previously validated" the elemental make-up of a particular sample of water in a specific time and place. Bethrick essentially equivocates on his use of the term "water" when he uses it in his illustration to refer to the specific sample of water and then uses it again to refer to water in a much more general, if not universal sense. The scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water as he has not tested water as such. It is, yet again, dishonest of Bethrick to act as though I have not provided a reason for the claim that I make that the scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water. Further, as mentioned, Bethrick's questions would cut both ways anyway. We may simply turn the questions Bethrick asks around for him to answer, "How do you know that the scientist [does know this]? How do you know what someone else does or does not know?" Of course on Bethrick's view I do not see how he can know that other people have the consciousnesses that I would presume are required for knowledge anyway, so asking questions like how one person knows what another person knows become even more interesting.
Obviously my mind is not identical to the mind which is said to know and control everything, and Bethrick is well aware that I believe this. Again with the dishonesty. This aside, a mind need not be identical to another mind in order to receive information from it.
Bethrick fails to distinguish between causation and a particular causal process in his response, something I did not do in my post, as he writes, 'How do you know that I cannot observe causation?' in response to 'Bethrick does not know the causal process..." Once he does this we can move on to topics like how his worldview supposedly allows him to observe causation and how his worldview supposedly allows for causality which is knowable. Based on Bethrick's previous rampant redefinition of terms to suit his fancy I suspect we will be receiving some completely nonsense 'description' of causal processes made up in order to skate around the problems raised rather than to actually deal with them.
Bethrick writes: “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.” When I write, “Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” the referent of "this" is the statement regarding being in the same boat together. Is Bethrick really so ignorant of Christian beliefs that he thinks I am claiming omniscience for myself? Of course not. It is just more dishonest, empty rhetoric. I ask the reader to question why someone would need to constantly resort to this type of tactic.
Bethrick asks, '...what does merely believing "in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie" have to do with anything?' I trust that the reader is competent enough to understand the argument and that Bethick has no answer for it, hence the pretended ignorance. All-knowing, truthful God revealing His certain knowledge to us provides us with certain knowledge of what has been revealed. I am sorry, this is not difficult.
Once again I call upon Mr. Bethrick to repent from his sin and believe on the living Christ who will not cast him away.
Objectivists, as I understand it, have never quite been accepted in the realm of academic philosophy (if you do not believe me, try to research the topic via philosophical sources; most encyclopedias do not even mention Objectivism or Rand). Their terminology is often extremely vague, and there is reason for this. Rand was after certainty in a world which told her, and everyone else, that there is no such thing. She presented ideas to counter this, to give people a place to stand that is peppered with pragmatism. Philosophy is not a joke or a game to Objectivists, they want something they can live and die by without worrying about the skeptic.
Of course, fiction books and obfuscation are not the route to countering, for example, the rigorous skeptical epistemologies found in the non-Christian schools I grew up in nor the atheistic and liberal Philosophy and Religion departments I did my undergraduate work in. If one is to be honest with oneself, he or she cannot simply hand waive the arguments which have been offered by the skeptics since the beginning of recorded philosophical inquiry. Thankfully there is good news for gentlemen like Mr. Bethrick. Christ offers hope for those who would find none in their allegedly God-less, directionless worlds. Christ offers certainty and knowledge as a response to the foolish wisdom of the world. All of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Him.
Unfortunately Bethrick has continued his dishonest (or perhaps ignorant, though I do not know how this could be the case at this point in his "career") denial of rather basic facts; substituting for reality his own arbitrary beliefs to try and escape from argumentation and the skepticism it leads to.
For example Bethrick writes that there is no such thing as a circular definition, which is just false. I invite the reader to study a little logic and he or she will come across discussions of circular definitions rather quickly. Even Googling "circular definitions" brings up a lengthy list. ( For example - http://www.onegoodmove.org/fallacy/circle.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_definition )
Bethrick often recommends books. I will return the favor and recommend Copi's Introduction to Logic, which contains a useful discussion of this subject.
Upon studying the topic of definitions in the broader subject of logic, one may also discover that definitions are often provided by way of example. Bethrick claims that I have written something "patently false" when I state that he does not provide a definition for "previously validated' by way of example. Calling something patently false with the result that it actually becomes such may be fine in Bethrick's Peter Pan epistemology, but it does not work out so well in reality. As I explained, the illustration provided by Bethrick does not exemplify "previously validated" at all, which is what is needed if Bethrick seeks to define the term by way of example. Again, the "definition" provided is circular, it presents us with no new understanding of the term in question. Further, “the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works.” Bethrick responds to this, "You didn’t ask me to show how it works. I was only responding to the questions which you had asked." No, I did not ask him to show me how it works, I asked him for a definition of what it is. He may do this by way of a non-circular definition, example, obstensibly, etc. but the point is that he has done none of the above. It may help the reader to review my previous post concerning this.
I will not at this moment take the time to review what Bethrick said concerning whether or not previously validated (whatever that means, he still has not told us) facts can be unseated by newly experienced facts. It is possible I misquoted him. It is not important. If Bethrick thinks that new facts can unseat previously validated facts but do not ever actually do so then there is no pragmatic distinction being made. The argument remains the same.
The vacuousness of the next part of Bethrick's response is equivalent to that of the part already discussed as Bethrick fails to see when the very arguments he uses apply to his own position. Recall, for example, that Bethrick submits in his illustration that the scientist, after having apparently tested or at least after having relied upon testimony of the testing of water, knows that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Now, I submitted that the scientist does not know this at all, for the scientist has only "previously validated" the elemental make-up of a particular sample of water in a specific time and place. Bethrick essentially equivocates on his use of the term "water" when he uses it in his illustration to refer to the specific sample of water and then uses it again to refer to water in a much more general, if not universal sense. The scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water as he has not tested water as such. It is, yet again, dishonest of Bethrick to act as though I have not provided a reason for the claim that I make that the scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water. Further, as mentioned, Bethrick's questions would cut both ways anyway. We may simply turn the questions Bethrick asks around for him to answer, "How do you know that the scientist [does know this]? How do you know what someone else does or does not know?" Of course on Bethrick's view I do not see how he can know that other people have the consciousnesses that I would presume are required for knowledge anyway, so asking questions like how one person knows what another person knows become even more interesting.
Obviously my mind is not identical to the mind which is said to know and control everything, and Bethrick is well aware that I believe this. Again with the dishonesty. This aside, a mind need not be identical to another mind in order to receive information from it.
Bethrick fails to distinguish between causation and a particular causal process in his response, something I did not do in my post, as he writes, 'How do you know that I cannot observe causation?' in response to 'Bethrick does not know the causal process..." Once he does this we can move on to topics like how his worldview supposedly allows him to observe causation and how his worldview supposedly allows for causality which is knowable. Based on Bethrick's previous rampant redefinition of terms to suit his fancy I suspect we will be receiving some completely nonsense 'description' of causal processes made up in order to skate around the problems raised rather than to actually deal with them.
Bethrick writes: “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.” When I write, “Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” the referent of "this" is the statement regarding being in the same boat together. Is Bethrick really so ignorant of Christian beliefs that he thinks I am claiming omniscience for myself? Of course not. It is just more dishonest, empty rhetoric. I ask the reader to question why someone would need to constantly resort to this type of tactic.
Bethrick asks, '...what does merely believing "in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie" have to do with anything?' I trust that the reader is competent enough to understand the argument and that Bethick has no answer for it, hence the pretended ignorance. All-knowing, truthful God revealing His certain knowledge to us provides us with certain knowledge of what has been revealed. I am sorry, this is not difficult.
Once again I call upon Mr. Bethrick to repent from his sin and believe on the living Christ who will not cast him away.
All Bethrick All The Time
I asked Mr. Bethrick what “previously validated knowledge” is, since he claims one can know a great deal based upon this, to which he responded, “Previously validated knowledge is knowledge that has already been validated, specifically in the context of new discoveries.”
Of course, circular definitions are definitions which are circular. I do not see that Bethrick ever actually defines what he means by previous validation in a non-circular way nor does he offer an example. He apparently attempts to offer an example of “previous validation” but the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works. Additionally, the so called instance of previous validation offered turns out to be an illustration of something other than what he has already presented regarding previously validated facts. Bethrick has mentioned before that previously validated facts cannot be unseated by newly experienced facts while the current illustration is of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts that are presumably based upon or at least involve previously validated facts. Bethrick has not given us a non-circular definition or example of “previously validated knowledge” and has not illustrated that newly experienced facts do not unseat previously validated knowledge.
Bethrick’s illustration of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts based upon or involving previously validated facts is as follows:
“…when a scientist studies the flow tendencies of rain water in a particular valley, he does not have to begin every day of his research by discovering the elemental make-up of water. Once this has been discovered and validated, he can move on to exploring new discoveries. That water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, is knowledge that has, in the context of the scientist’s research, been previously validated.”
My problem with this illustration is that the referent of “this” in the second sentence of the illustration is to the elemental make-up of water. Bethrick writes that the elemental make-up of water has been discovered and validated, but this is incorrect. The elemental make-up of water on a particular day in a particular valley has been discovered by a particular scientist if it was discovered by the scientist at all and if Bethrick’s validation is the kind of process which can bring one to this kind of knowledge to begin with. The scientist in the illustration does not know what the elemental make-up of all water is or what the elemental make-up of other water is or what the elemental make-up of elsewhere water is or if the elemental-makeup of water which was previously validated has not changed since yesterday.
He writes, “Perhaps Bolt thinks I need to go out and test every raindrop that has ever fallen on earth in order to be 'certain' that rain is composed of water droplets. With such requirements for any generalized certainty, it seems to be an unattainable commodity”.
Well yes, it is unattainable for him, and not just certainty, but for probability as well. He posits that this is the same for those receiving knowledge from a supernatural source, which of course it is not if that source knows and controls everything.
How does Bethrick try to deal with his problem here? He writes, “But if we understand the causal process which produces rain (cf. condensation of water vapor in the atmosphere), why would such tests be needed?” Of course, Mr. Bethrick does not know the causal process which produces rain, for not only can he not observe causation, he does not know that the same causal process produces all rain. He then asks if people who depend on and collect rain water for their survival need to perform such tests. The answer is contingent upon what he means by “need”.
Bethrick writes, “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.”
Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie. Bethrick apparently thinks it would be clever and profitable to ask questions like, “What if your God could lie though? What if your God does not know everything? What if your God has fur?” but as has already been explained to him multiple times now, I believe in the Christian God who neither lies nor lacks knowledge nor has fur. It has become evident that Bethrick cannot answer the arguments presented based on this conception of God and so he must resort to setting up a straw man and attacking the presuppositional argument by substituting another god that none of us believe in to begin with. At this point it has become clear that Bethrick is just dishonest when it comes to this part of the argument.
Bethrick does not accept that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge. I do not see that it would be difficult to illustrate that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge however, which would of course have the interesting result that the prior fact was not knowledge after all. Let us suppose that the scientist tested and determined that the water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen then woke up to find that while he had dreamed this, the world, which included water, was really very different and water was made up of different elements, elements which were not even on the Periodic Table of the Elements in his dream world. Perhaps there is no such Table in the real world that he did not experience prior to waking up. We thought we had validated the fact that Pluto is a planet. Now if we can be wrong with respect to all sorts of similar things and indeed often are, why can we not be wrong with respect to essentially everything in similar fashion?
If the world is as Bethrick posits that it is then there is always a possibility that some hitherto unknown fact may radically change our apparent knowledge of the world as it is now. This fact may be related to something as seemingly insignificant as where the end of a sentence is in a Greek manuscript or it could be an extremely significant fact with huge consequences for what we know. How do we know that new information will fit with old rather than overturn it? The truth is that we do not know this at all if the world is as Bethick submits that it is.
Bethrick invites me to produce some fact or facts which will overturn a piece of his knowledge, however the argument does not rest upon exemplary facts, which would miss the whole point, but upon the possibility that there are such facts. We know that there are such facts with respect to some parts of knowledge, why not with respect to other parts of knowledge? The argument does not require that I produce any facts to overturn what we know about rain. If Bethrick does not know that there are no such facts, then he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain. Bethrick does not know all facts, hence he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain.
Bethrick makes the following amusing statement in a last ditch effort to wish away the reality of skepticism he is forced to accept for sake of consistency with his own program. He states,
“I do not ascribe [I think he meant to write “subscribe”] to the epistemological model which equates “possibility” with whatever the human mind can imagine. I can imagine breathing water, but I do not accept it as a possibility that I will ever be able to breathe water. To affirm a possibility, one needs at least some evidence to support it, and no evidence against it.”
Apparently suggesting that other peoples’ gods have fur and redefining terms at will is not enough for would-be autonomous Bethrick, as he now gets to decide what is possible! I do not find this to be very “objective” at all. Since Dawson Bethrick does not accept that it is possible to ever be able to breathe water, it is therefore impossible that he will ever be able to breathe water. Never mind that we can imagine a world in which Bethrick can breathe water, never mind that there is nothing at all logically inconsistent with Bethrick breathing water, and never mind that upon consistent Bethrick presuppositions we cannot determine that breathing water will be physically problematic at some time in the future; no, Dawson Bethrick is the sole determiner of what is possible and impossible! Bethrick said it, I believe it, and that settles it! I for one am glad that Bethrick did not live in the past and believe that Earth is flat, as it would have forever been impossible that it should be otherwise. Imagine back-in-the-day-Bethrick experiencing the flatness of Earth and never hearing of planetary motion. No evidence to support Earth being other than flat, and no evidence against earth being flat either, so forget the possibility that Earth is as we know it to be now. Forget cars and the Internet as well. I am sure if we pressed this further we could come up with all sorts of interesting results, but it suffices to say that Bethrick, in his sinful autonomy, wants to be like God, determining what is possible. He does this even at the expense of leaving every definition offered by Webster’s for “possibility” and “possible” behind, the same dictionary he uses to try and justify his calling God a magical being. Why start being consistent now though?
By the way, the Bible never uses such a term as “magic” to describe God and neither should Bethrick, first because Bethrick inconsistently appeals to Webster’s on the definition of this term but not “possibility”, second because he apparently misunderstands the definition he cites anyway, as said definition mentions extraordinary power or influence which is “seemingly” from a supernatural source, (What supernatural *source* is God *seemingly* from according to the Bible?) third because “magic” is a noun, not an adjective, fourth because the adjective related to the noun is so closely related to the noun that it falls prey to the same problems of labeling the God of the Bible as “magic”, and fifth because the term is clearly intended to conjure(since we are talking about magic) up in the mind of the reader a picture of evidentiary status like unto fantasy creatures which is to beg the question. God does not cast magical spells, but he does command men everywhere to repent.
I asked Mr. Bethrick how he knows that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it.
He states that his answer is simple. His answer is that he knows this by a means of knowledge. This is almost as enlightening as "previously validated" meaning "validated previously". He goes on to specify that he knows this through his reason. Okay, so far so good, but how does Bethrick know through the use of reason? He goes on to say that he uses a method called logic. I would ask Mr. Bethrick which law of logic he utilizes to know that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it, but it appears that he has once again redefined a term. Bethrick describes logic as “an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge”. How do you know your water won’t turn into merlot? “Well the answer is simple, I know through an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge.” Most of us have encountered something like this answer in a field at least once. It really is a simple question. Where is the simple answer promised? I do not see how drinking a glass of water has a great deal to do with new knowledge as far as what we are concerned with here, and in any event Bethrick has not explained how he integrates his knowledge with what he has already validated, whatever "validated" means. It is not that Bethrick cannot be certain about the water remaining water, it is that he cannot know at all that it will. He moves on to attempting to set up another straw man concept of a god that Christians do not believe in only this time he wants us to believe in a god who is malevolent and has a tattoo of Silent Bob on its stomach.
Of course, circular definitions are definitions which are circular. I do not see that Bethrick ever actually defines what he means by previous validation in a non-circular way nor does he offer an example. He apparently attempts to offer an example of “previous validation” but the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works. Additionally, the so called instance of previous validation offered turns out to be an illustration of something other than what he has already presented regarding previously validated facts. Bethrick has mentioned before that previously validated facts cannot be unseated by newly experienced facts while the current illustration is of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts that are presumably based upon or at least involve previously validated facts. Bethrick has not given us a non-circular definition or example of “previously validated knowledge” and has not illustrated that newly experienced facts do not unseat previously validated knowledge.
Bethrick’s illustration of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts based upon or involving previously validated facts is as follows:
“…when a scientist studies the flow tendencies of rain water in a particular valley, he does not have to begin every day of his research by discovering the elemental make-up of water. Once this has been discovered and validated, he can move on to exploring new discoveries. That water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, is knowledge that has, in the context of the scientist’s research, been previously validated.”
My problem with this illustration is that the referent of “this” in the second sentence of the illustration is to the elemental make-up of water. Bethrick writes that the elemental make-up of water has been discovered and validated, but this is incorrect. The elemental make-up of water on a particular day in a particular valley has been discovered by a particular scientist if it was discovered by the scientist at all and if Bethrick’s validation is the kind of process which can bring one to this kind of knowledge to begin with. The scientist in the illustration does not know what the elemental make-up of all water is or what the elemental make-up of other water is or what the elemental make-up of elsewhere water is or if the elemental-makeup of water which was previously validated has not changed since yesterday.
He writes, “Perhaps Bolt thinks I need to go out and test every raindrop that has ever fallen on earth in order to be 'certain' that rain is composed of water droplets. With such requirements for any generalized certainty, it seems to be an unattainable commodity”.
Well yes, it is unattainable for him, and not just certainty, but for probability as well. He posits that this is the same for those receiving knowledge from a supernatural source, which of course it is not if that source knows and controls everything.
How does Bethrick try to deal with his problem here? He writes, “But if we understand the causal process which produces rain (cf. condensation of water vapor in the atmosphere), why would such tests be needed?” Of course, Mr. Bethrick does not know the causal process which produces rain, for not only can he not observe causation, he does not know that the same causal process produces all rain. He then asks if people who depend on and collect rain water for their survival need to perform such tests. The answer is contingent upon what he means by “need”.
Bethrick writes, “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.”
Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie. Bethrick apparently thinks it would be clever and profitable to ask questions like, “What if your God could lie though? What if your God does not know everything? What if your God has fur?” but as has already been explained to him multiple times now, I believe in the Christian God who neither lies nor lacks knowledge nor has fur. It has become evident that Bethrick cannot answer the arguments presented based on this conception of God and so he must resort to setting up a straw man and attacking the presuppositional argument by substituting another god that none of us believe in to begin with. At this point it has become clear that Bethrick is just dishonest when it comes to this part of the argument.
Bethrick does not accept that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge. I do not see that it would be difficult to illustrate that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge however, which would of course have the interesting result that the prior fact was not knowledge after all. Let us suppose that the scientist tested and determined that the water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen then woke up to find that while he had dreamed this, the world, which included water, was really very different and water was made up of different elements, elements which were not even on the Periodic Table of the Elements in his dream world. Perhaps there is no such Table in the real world that he did not experience prior to waking up. We thought we had validated the fact that Pluto is a planet. Now if we can be wrong with respect to all sorts of similar things and indeed often are, why can we not be wrong with respect to essentially everything in similar fashion?
If the world is as Bethrick posits that it is then there is always a possibility that some hitherto unknown fact may radically change our apparent knowledge of the world as it is now. This fact may be related to something as seemingly insignificant as where the end of a sentence is in a Greek manuscript or it could be an extremely significant fact with huge consequences for what we know. How do we know that new information will fit with old rather than overturn it? The truth is that we do not know this at all if the world is as Bethick submits that it is.
Bethrick invites me to produce some fact or facts which will overturn a piece of his knowledge, however the argument does not rest upon exemplary facts, which would miss the whole point, but upon the possibility that there are such facts. We know that there are such facts with respect to some parts of knowledge, why not with respect to other parts of knowledge? The argument does not require that I produce any facts to overturn what we know about rain. If Bethrick does not know that there are no such facts, then he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain. Bethrick does not know all facts, hence he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain.
Bethrick makes the following amusing statement in a last ditch effort to wish away the reality of skepticism he is forced to accept for sake of consistency with his own program. He states,
“I do not ascribe [I think he meant to write “subscribe”] to the epistemological model which equates “possibility” with whatever the human mind can imagine. I can imagine breathing water, but I do not accept it as a possibility that I will ever be able to breathe water. To affirm a possibility, one needs at least some evidence to support it, and no evidence against it.”
Apparently suggesting that other peoples’ gods have fur and redefining terms at will is not enough for would-be autonomous Bethrick, as he now gets to decide what is possible! I do not find this to be very “objective” at all. Since Dawson Bethrick does not accept that it is possible to ever be able to breathe water, it is therefore impossible that he will ever be able to breathe water. Never mind that we can imagine a world in which Bethrick can breathe water, never mind that there is nothing at all logically inconsistent with Bethrick breathing water, and never mind that upon consistent Bethrick presuppositions we cannot determine that breathing water will be physically problematic at some time in the future; no, Dawson Bethrick is the sole determiner of what is possible and impossible! Bethrick said it, I believe it, and that settles it! I for one am glad that Bethrick did not live in the past and believe that Earth is flat, as it would have forever been impossible that it should be otherwise. Imagine back-in-the-day-Bethrick experiencing the flatness of Earth and never hearing of planetary motion. No evidence to support Earth being other than flat, and no evidence against earth being flat either, so forget the possibility that Earth is as we know it to be now. Forget cars and the Internet as well. I am sure if we pressed this further we could come up with all sorts of interesting results, but it suffices to say that Bethrick, in his sinful autonomy, wants to be like God, determining what is possible. He does this even at the expense of leaving every definition offered by Webster’s for “possibility” and “possible” behind, the same dictionary he uses to try and justify his calling God a magical being. Why start being consistent now though?
By the way, the Bible never uses such a term as “magic” to describe God and neither should Bethrick, first because Bethrick inconsistently appeals to Webster’s on the definition of this term but not “possibility”, second because he apparently misunderstands the definition he cites anyway, as said definition mentions extraordinary power or influence which is “seemingly” from a supernatural source, (What supernatural *source* is God *seemingly* from according to the Bible?) third because “magic” is a noun, not an adjective, fourth because the adjective related to the noun is so closely related to the noun that it falls prey to the same problems of labeling the God of the Bible as “magic”, and fifth because the term is clearly intended to conjure(since we are talking about magic) up in the mind of the reader a picture of evidentiary status like unto fantasy creatures which is to beg the question. God does not cast magical spells, but he does command men everywhere to repent.
I asked Mr. Bethrick how he knows that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it.
He states that his answer is simple. His answer is that he knows this by a means of knowledge. This is almost as enlightening as "previously validated" meaning "validated previously". He goes on to specify that he knows this through his reason. Okay, so far so good, but how does Bethrick know through the use of reason? He goes on to say that he uses a method called logic. I would ask Mr. Bethrick which law of logic he utilizes to know that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it, but it appears that he has once again redefined a term. Bethrick describes logic as “an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge”. How do you know your water won’t turn into merlot? “Well the answer is simple, I know through an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge.” Most of us have encountered something like this answer in a field at least once. It really is a simple question. Where is the simple answer promised? I do not see how drinking a glass of water has a great deal to do with new knowledge as far as what we are concerned with here, and in any event Bethrick has not explained how he integrates his knowledge with what he has already validated, whatever "validated" means. It is not that Bethrick cannot be certain about the water remaining water, it is that he cannot know at all that it will. He moves on to attempting to set up another straw man concept of a god that Christians do not believe in only this time he wants us to believe in a god who is malevolent and has a tattoo of Silent Bob on its stomach.
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